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The underlying intuition is straightforward. Given the structure of wage bargaining in East Germany, wage subsidies may be expected to lead to excessive real wage increases, whereas revenue-or profit-sharing subsidies may not. The reason is that revenue-or profit-sharing may be expeCted to bring th? labour market close to full employment even when the associated subsidies are negligibly small. These subsidies can thus be devoted entirely to the achievement .of the government's wage targets. By contrast, negligibly small wage subsidies cannot be expected to generate full employment under current East German labour market conditions, and subsidies that are sufficiently large for this purpose will drive real wages far above the government's wage objectives.
There is good reason to believe, however, that this by no means exhausts the advantages of revenue-sharing subsidies relative to wage subsidies. Wage subsidies distort the labour-capital ratio, whereas revenue-or profit-sharing subsidies do not. Moreover, in small enterprises where individual workers' labour . inputs can have a noticeable effect on the profits of their enterprise, the revenueor profit-sharing subsidies may be expected to have incentive effects that the wage subsidies cannot reproduce.
Furthermore, it is important to observe that the above-mentioned deficiency of wage subsidies is generally also shared by output, export, credit, and investment subsidies. All of these subsidies tend to increase the marginal value product of labour and thereby raise the amount of economic rent that may be partially appropriated by workers in the wage-bargaining process. These subsidies, like the wage subsidies" thus lead to wage increases, and subsidies that are sufficiently high to ensure full employment may generate real wages far in excess, of government targets.
Finally, it is significant that many of the most serious criticisms levelled against the establishment of profit-or revenue-sharing schemes in mature market economies appear to lose much of their force with regard to economies that are in the process of transformation to a market mechanism. It has been asserted, for example, that managers of firms may have a substantial incentive to resist switching from a wage system to a profit-or revenue-sharing system, because the latter involves revealing revenue information to the employees. Moreover, the insiders in these firms may also have an incentive to resi~t, since they may be able to achieve higher remuneration under the wage system. It is clear, however, that these problems are likely to be much more pronounced for existing firms that have operated under cl wage system in the past and that employ workforces containing a large proportion of insiders. Yet East Germany, like other East European economies, has experienced such substantial shifts in final demand that the establishment of a revenue-sharing system would lead to the destruction of most old firms and the creation of many new ones. Thus it is to be expected that most of the jobs operating .under the revenue-sharing system would not .involve switching from the wage system and reparameterizing insider contracts, and would thereby avoid the conflicts with the vested interests of incumbent workers and firms.
In view of these various considerations, the analysis above suggests that revenue-sharing subsidies deserve more attention in the policy debate concerning employment stimulation in East Germany -as well as in other East European economies -than they have thus far received.
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Reducing the Cost of Stimulating East German Employment
Dennis J. Snower
I. Introduction
This paper provides a brief overview of the East German employment problem and the deficiencies of the current employment policies, and then builds a simple model in which alternative policy proposals can be analyzed. Only two proposals are considered here: (0 wage subsidies, which is perhaps the employment policy that most economists would currently recommend to replace the current array of employment stimuli,l and (iil revenue-or profit-sharing subsidies, which this p'kper seeks to draw to policy makers' attention. Revenue-or profit-sharing subsidies have received as good as no consideration in the· ongoing public debate on how to raise East German employment efficiently. This paper suggests that this may be a serious omission.
Given the labor market conditions in East Germany today, it appears likely that the social and budgetary costs associated with revenue-or profit-sharing subsidies would be lower than those associated with wage subsidies.
It would be trivial to analyze other employment policies particularly output, investment, export, and credit subsidies in the context of the model -and to derive the associated social and budgetary costs, although for brevity I do not do so here. Suffice it to say that the reasons that make revenue-sharing subsidies attractive relative to wage subsidies also apply, with a few modifications. to output and investment subsidies.
As the paper makes clear, there is little if anything in the present analysis that ties the conclusions of this analysis more to East Germany than to other East European economies in the process of transformation to a market system. The case for revenue-sharing subsidies appears equally applicable to, say, Czechoslovakia.
Hungary, and Poland.
The intuition underlying the message of the paper, namely, that the revenuesharing subsidies necessary for full employment may be expected to entail a smaller lSee, for example, Akerlof et al. (1992) . 1 straightforward. Given the structure of wage bargaining in East Germany, wage subsidies may be expected to lead to excessive real wage increases, whereas revenueor profit-sharing subsidies do not share this disadvantage. The reason is that revenue-or profit-sharing may be expected to bring the labor market close to full employment even when the associated subsidies are negligibly small, and thus these subsidies can be devoted entirely to the achievement of the government's wage targets. By contrast, negligibly small wage subsidies certainly cannot be expected to generate full employment under current East German labor market conditions, and subsidies that are sufficiently large for this purpose may be expected to drive real wages far above the government's wage objectives.
It is worth stressing that this argument is probably a gross understatement of the advantages of revenue-or profit-sharing subsidies relative to wage subsidies, since it does not take account of the incentive effect? and. factor composition effects of these policies.
Section 2 provides a brief summary of East Germany's current employment problem. Section 3 presents a simple model of the East German labor market and uses it to document the need for government intervention by describing the problems that would arise in the absence of such intervention. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the effects of wage subsidies and revenue-sharing subsidies in this context. Section 6 concludes.
The Current Employment Problem
It is widely recognized that the policies the German government has implemented thus far to stimulate East German employment have been inefficient and have incurred. an unduly high budgetary cost., The problem, in the opinion of many observers, was not that the government's wage and employment targets were set inappropriately high. It was clear from the outset that the political, process of German unification would be not be meaningful unless it was accompanied by a rapid fall in the wage differential between. East and West Germany without simultaneously creating a rapid rise in the unemployment differential between these two regions.
Either differential, it was recognized, could lead to a massive migration of workers from East to West Germany, thereby reducing the potential for making East Germany productive and putting downward pressure on the real wages and employment 2 REVENUE-SHARING SUBSIDIES AS EMPLOYMENT POLICY probabilities of West German workers. It was equally clear that it would take some time for the productivity differential between East and West Germany to disappear.
The creation of new firms in the east, the dismantling of inefficient organizational practicies, the modernization of existing plant and equipment, and the retraining of workers in accordance with demand-led output adjustments were all known to take a significant amount of time.
The upshot of these considerations is that it would be inevitable that East
Germany would have to go through a substantial period in which labor incomes exceeded productivity and employment would have to be sustained at level where the marginal product-of labor fell far short of the marginal value of time. The implication was that East German employment would have to be subsidized. On all this there was wide agreement. What was up for debate was the form these subsidies would take.
2a. Sources of Ineffir;:iency in EmploYn;tent Policies Thus Far
The policies that were in fact implemented were wide-ranging and diverse.
There were subsidies for investment, research and development, exports, and credit; these were supplemented by work-creating measures, vocational training schemes, early retirement and transitory retirement regulations, and subsidies for short-time work.
In addition, the Treuhandanstalt sought to create employment· opportunities through transfers to loss-making firms, debt write-offs, and privatization. This vast array of policies has proved to be seriously wasteful in several important respects.
The absence of clear-cut and general rules on which subsidies to offer to which enterprises in which amounts over which period of time has meant that the Treuhandanstalt has had to consider each case independently. As result, policy implementation has been costly and unnecessarily slow. The process of keeping lossmaking enterprises in business through individually negotiated hand-outs has diverted manpower and resources from the privatization process, and has kept resources tied to inefficient production processes and unwanted outputs.
In addition, the case-by-case approach has vastly increased the returns from redistributional battles. Many inefficient East German enterprises found that the payoff from lobbying was higher than that from restructuring. The upshot was doubtlessly a sizeable waste of potential managerial resources and a socially undesirable incentive to use political pressure to maintain the status quo rather 3 REVENUE-SHARING SUBSIDIES AS EMPLOYMENT POLICY than to reorganize production in accordance with consumer demand.
The absence of effective limits on the Treuhand's budget meant that there were insufficient incentives, on the part of both the Treuhand and the managers of East
German enterprises, to keep the costs of restructuring in check. Policy makers made little attempt to subsidize loss-making firms through a cost-minimizing set of policy instruments and managers saw little need to respond to given policies in a costminimizing way.
2b. Unemployment and Productivity
As it turned out, the policies above were unable to prevent a dramatic rise in They cite that the most common problem are those of valuing existing East German firms, followed by insufficient infrastructure, followed by environmental uncertainties and legal problems.
Aside from the productivity gap, East Germany also suffers from the structural problem that workers are employed in .inappropriate sectors. Comparisons of the sectoral distribution of employment in East and West Germany are instructive in this context. For example, whereas 9.9'7. of the East German workforce in 1991 was employed in agriculture, forestry, and fishing, only 3.9'7. of the West German workforce was employed there. On the other hand, only 0.7'7. of East German employment was devoted to banking and insurance, the corresponding West German figure is 3.1'7.. 4 East German output after unification was clearly not suited to consumer This approach seemed curious to many economists, who pointed out that a closing of the wage differential would lead to a widening of the unemployment differential and that migration tends to be more sensitive to the latter differential 
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than the former. This argument, however, does· not take account of the German unemployment benefit system, which makes the size of the unemployment benefits highly dependent on the previously earned wage. Consequently, workers who faced the likely prospect of plant closure had a powerful incentive to press for high wages in order to secure maximal unemployment benefits in the future. This incentive, incidentally, was equally strong for the managers of loss-making firms. Thus none of the parties to these negotiations stood to benefit substantially from wage restraint. For its part, the Treuhand did little to lean against the wind; on the whole, tried not to get involved in wage negotiations.
The resultingly high wage settlements and the associated, generous unemployment benefits undoubtedly did much to moderate migration flows. In view of this effect, the narrowing of wage differentials may well have had a stronger effect in keeping East German workers at home than a narrowing of unemployment differentials would have had.
It is in the context. of the above incentive structure that the East German wage developments after unification are to be understood. From the third quarter of 1990 to the second quarter of 1991 the contractual hourly wage rate per full-time East German employee rose 32'7., the consumption wage (Le. the contractual wage deflated by the cost-of-living index) rose by 15'7., while the product wage (Le. the gross hourly wage rate plus 15'7. for non-wage costs, deflated by the producer price index) rose by as much as 31'7.. 7
It is important to emphasize that bargaining over contractual wages through Germany tends to be conducted primarily by sector and geographic region. Moreover, actual wages can exceed the negotiated contractual levels on account of wage drift.
The geographical differentiation has meant that there has been no overriding On the basis of these observations, we now proceed to build a simple model of the East German labor market.
A Simple Model of the Current Employment Problem
Our model deals with labor market activity in an individual sector of the economy (e.g. construction, food, retail trade). It focuses attention on the value of a job to the firm and the worker. We consider two types of jobs, "old" ones with low productivity and "new" ones with high productivity. Let a(N) be the real marginal revenue product from a new job in a particular sector, where N stands for aggregate East German employment in that sector and a ' < 0 (diminishing returns to labor), and CY' a(N) be the real marginal revenue product from an old job, where 0 < CY < 1.
In line with the German wage setting process, we assume that wage bargaining is sector-specific, so that old and new jobs in each sector command the same wage, W.
Let b (a positive constant) be the real non-labor cost associated with each job. s
Then the real profit generated by an old job is
Whereas a new job yields
n Let E be the real fixed cost of creating a new job, H be the real cost of hiring and training a newly hired~orker, and F be the real cost of firing an incumbent worker. Then, under single period optimization,9 an old job is kept open as long as
SWe could have assumed that b(N), with b ' >0, Le.' a rising non-labor cost per worker, but for expositional simplicity we include any such effects in a(N).
9This is not an assumption of substance. It is easy to show that the qualitative conclusions of our analysis also hold under multi-period optimization.
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which will be called the "incumbency constraint" (lC). A new job is created when
which is the "entry constraint" (EC). We assume that wages and employment are determined in a Nash equilibrium setting. Specifically, employment decisions are made taking wages as given and wage decisions are made taking employment as given. This setup differs from the standard analysis in which wage-employment decisions are made in two stages, with wages set first (taking the employment repercussions into account) and then employment (taking wages as given). The relative merits of these alternative frameworks depend on the relative frequency with which wage and employment decisions are made. Given significant costs of creating new jobs as well as significant costs of hiring, training, and firing -a particularly important assumption when considering the East
German employment problem -it is often unrealistic to view wages as precommitted when employment decisions are made. Our setup implicitly presupposes that· neither wages nor employment can be renegotiated instantaneously and that they are generally not set simultaneously.10
Wages are assumed to be set by a Nash bargain between the employers and employees in a sector. The employers cover both old and new jobs in that sector, and the employees are represented by a union which seeks to maximize the utility of its representative member. Under bargaining agreement, each employee receives the real wage W (taking employment (N) in that sector as given). Under disagreement, each employee is assumed to look for another job. With probability p he finds another job and then receives the real "outside wage" W. The employment probability p depends on labor demand and supply not only in East~ermany, but also in West Germany and, to a lesser extent, abroad. Both the employment probability p and the outside wage Ware exogenously given when the wage W is determined. With probability (I-p) the worker finds no job and he then receives an exogenously given unemployment benefit 8. u Thus Under disagreement the job is kept vacant, yielding no revenue and generating the cost b. A new job under agreement generates profit n, given by (tb), and yields
neither revenue nor cost under disagreement. Given that there are M old jobs and N jobs in total in the sector under consideration, the employers' bargaining objective may be specified as
Given the bargaining objectives (3a) and (3b), the wage may be derived as the outcome of the following Nash bargain: 12
where Il (a constant, 0~Il~1) is a measure of the bargaining strength of the employees relative to the employers. Let ,the proportion of old jobs be bargaining process, we are justified in assuming that the unemployment benefit is exogenous as well.
I2The wage W in our analysis is defined as the real wage. Whereas it is unrealistic to assume that employers and employees bargain over the real wage, it would be trivial to restate our model in terms of bargaining over the nominal wage, with prices set by the employers under perfectly or imperfectly competitive conditions in the product markets.
(Sa) (3 == (M/N) and define the average productivity factor as (Sb) f == (3'r + 0-(3l.
Then the negotiated wage, that solves the bargaining problem (4) may be expressed as
which will be called the "negotiated wage function" (WN). is parallel to the entry constraint. The figure implicitly assumes -as in probably realistic in most cases -that the productivity differential between new and old jobs exceeds the cost of job turnover:
Then the entry constraint lies above the incumbency constraint and the labor market equilibrium is given by the intersection of the negotiated wage function (6) and the entry constraint (Zb).14 Specifically, at the equilibrium wage W·, new jobs will be created until employment is N· (as determined by the entry constraint); and at the equilibrium level of employment N·, the negotiated wage will be W· (as determined by the wage setting function)'
13The reason is that even if Y were equal to zero (so that the wage setting function WS would be unambiguously downward sloping), the EC curve would be steeper than the WS curve since /-1<1.
14If, on the contrary, (I-r)' a(N) < E + H + F, then the incumbency constraint lies above the entry -constraint and the labor market equilibrium is given by the intersection of the WS and le curves. Under these conditions no new jobs are created.
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By the negotiated wage function (6), the entry constraint (Zb), and the definitions (Sa)
and (Sb), the equilibrium wage is
where the superscript "e" in W· stands for "equilibrium" and the subscript "AG"_ AG stands for the wage in the "absence" of "government" intervention. If we assume that a(N) takes the Cobb-Douglas form a(N) = A' Na , the equilibrium employment level is
In the absence of the fixed cost (b equilibrium wage reduces to 0) and all entry barriers (F
and the equilibrium employment level becomes of the EC and WN curves. The full-employment level of employment, NF'E, is given by the intersection of the entry constraint (EC) and the labor supply curve (LS). To fix ideas, we assume that the government's employment target, N\ is equal to the full employment level NF'E, and that its wage target, W t , is equal to the equilibrium wage W· . The latter assumption is probably not unreasonable given the involvement of West
AG
German unions in the East German wage setting process. It is generally recognized
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that, in the absence of any government intervention, most old jobs would become unprofitable, necessitating the firing of rhost incumbents. It is also widely agreed that, in the short run at least, not enough new jobs would be created to avoid substantial unemployment. In terms of our figure this means that the point (M, W·) lies to the right of the incumbency constraint, so that at the equilibrium wage W· The obvious problem with this argument is that it presupposes perfect competition. If wage determination is imperfectly competitive, as it doubtelssly is East German labor markets, then the imposition of wage sUbsidi~s will raise the negotiated wage at any given level of employment. Then, if wt = W: G ' then a subsidy sufficie!1tly large to restore full employment will push wage outcomes above the target wage. wages~r~gen,~~~~I}'~~l:>~iye:g6}1.#rnment targets, and there is good reason to believe thatth~. teplac~rh~n(" of th~cur~ent emloyment policies by a wage subsidy program would raise real wages, simply because some of the current transfers to East German firms are not' relate~"to the magnitude of employment and consequently do not put upward pressure on the outcomes of wage negotiations. In short, it may be impossible to restore efficiency in production and employment at the target wage through wage subsidies.
This, of course, does not imply that wage subsidies are necessarily inappropriate to deal with the East German employment problem. The first-best optimum may be unattainable through any feasible policy intervention. The crucial issue is whether wage subsidies can achieve ·a second-best optimum, given that East German wages cannot faH. beneath the government's wage target.. Specifically, the' case for wage subsidies must rest on the argument that this policy. can achieve full employment with socially acceptable wages at lower social cost and/or lower government budgetary cost than other feasible proposals. It is this issue that the present paper calls into question. The equilibriumemploymeIit level becomes 
l -W r · (Ha) and (llb) indicate that the greater the wage subsidy s, the greater will be the resulting equilibrium employment level N· and, in the presence ws some entry barriers (F, H, E > 0), the greater will be the equilibrium wage W· . In ws fact, as the wage subsidy is raised from s=o to s=I, we can trace out a locus of labor market equilibrium points denoted by LE ws in Figure 1 . The greater the entry 14 REVENUE-SHARING SUBSIDIES AS EMPLOYMENT POLICY barriers (F, H, E), the steeper this locus will be. By (Ha), in the extreme case of no entry barriers (F = H = E = 0), the locus is horizontal.
From the figure it is clear that if W t = W· and some entry barriers exist, it AG is impossible to achieve the government's wage-employment target (Wt, N t ) through the wage subsidy scheme. A subsidy that raises employment to its target level N t will necessarily raise the equilibrium wage W· above its target level wt. In practice, ws the unwillingness of West German firms to engage in substantial in job creation after German unification, despite the massive government incentives to do so, leads one to believe -that the costs of firm entry (E) and perhaps also the costs of training in East Germany are large, and thus (by (Ha) and (lIb)) the LE ws locus may be expected to be steep. Then, provided that the wage target W t is in the neighborhood of the equilibrium wage W· in the absence of intervention, the full-employment wage under AG the subsidy scheme will far exceed the target wage. Now turn to the social benefit and the budgetary cost of a wage subsidy that is sufficiently high to raise employment to the full-employment level N
FE •
One appropriate measure of the social benefit (SB ws ) of the scheme is total production minus the direct budgetary cost mBC) of the scheme. Total production is r· N . In short, the additional tax revenue is ws
The rise in the value of firms as result of the wage subsidy scheme is
where < is the proportion of firms that remain to be privatized, Vws is the value of firms under the wage subsidy scheme, and VAG is their value in the absence of Let the government's revenue-sharing subsidy to. employers be B rr and to employees be By' so that the labor and profit incomes from old jobs become 
The entry constraint is therefore
and the incumbency constraint is I7
IbFor brevity, we restrict our attention to the case of "pure" revenue-and profitsharing, where workers receive all their labor income as a share of the revenues or profits they generate.
17The firing cost CF) in our model falls entirely on the firm; it is generally not feasible to pass it on to the employees when they leave the firm.
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To make these constraints comparable with the analysis in the previous sections, it will be convenient to restate them in terms of labor income. Accordingly, by (I7a) and (ISa), the entry constraint may be expressed as
and the incumbency constraint may be written as
Provided that (7) is satisfied, the entry constraint lies above the incumbency constraint in income-employment space, as shown in Figure 2 .
The wage .setting process now' involves negotiation over the .revenue-sharing coefficient A, rather than over the wage W. The employers' bargaining objective 18 is
The revenue sharing coefficient is the outcome of the Nash bargain:
Solving,
18Since workers' productivities are independent of one another in this model, the negotiated wage does not depend on whether employers and employees bargain individualistically or in groups.
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where An is the negotiated revenue-sharing coefficient and
is average income per head. Substituting the negotiated revenue-sharing coefficient (21) into the expressions for income in (l6a) and (l7a). we obtain the negotiated incomes that are generated by the revenue-sharing coefficient:
which we can call the "negotiated income function" for new entrants, denoted by· YN n in Figure 2 , and (23) , implies that the wage subsidies be set as follows:
Note that it is only the sum of the revenue-sharing subsidies to the employers and the employeess that are relevant to the achievement of the target labor income. Once this sum is set at the desired level (24b), the YN0 curve intersects the labor supply 20 curve at the target labor income w\ as shown in Figure 2 . Now consider the social benefit and the budgetary cost of this revenue sharing system. Measuring the social benefit in the same way as in the previous section, we
where SB RS is the social benefit under the optimal revenue sharing system and the third right-hand term is the direct budgetary cost. It is easy to show that, for a broad -range of plausible parameter values, this social benefit exceeds that from the optimal wage subsidy scheme, as described in the previous section. The main intuitive reason is that the optimal revenue-sharing scheme permits the achievement of both the scheme can achieve the full-employment target only when all workers receive more than the labor income target. Consequently the direct bUdgetary cost (DBC) of the optimal revenue-sharing scheme generally falls short of OBC of the optimal wage subisidy scheme. Comparing the labor remuneration equations under the wage subsidy and revenue-sharing schemes, it is easy to see that the greater the labor turnover costs (H and F) and the greater the entry cost (E) and the greater the ratio of old to new jobs ({3) -all of which are known to be very important in the East German labor market -the greater will be the direct budgetary cost of the wage-subsidy scheme relative to that of the revenue-sharing scheme.
As in the analysis of the previ?us section, the total budgetary cost consists the direct budgetary cost of the scheme minus the additional tax revenue from the scheme minus the additional value of the firms to be auctioned off. It may be expressed as
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It is easy to show that this total budgetary cost is less than that under the optimal wage subsidy scheme, provided that the revenue generated (Al is small relative to the non-wage costs. There are two counterveiling factors to be taken into account. First, as noted, the direct budgetary cost of the optimal revenue-sharing scheme is generally less than that of the optimal wage subsidy scheme. Second, if the revenue generated minus the non-Iabor remuneration costs is positive, then the value of the auctioned firms will be larger under the optimal wage subsidy scheme than under the optimal revenue-sharing scheme. The reason, obviously, is that under the revenue-sharing scheme only a fraction of the revenue mfnus non-Iabor remuneration costs accrue to the employers, whereas under the wage subsidy scheme all of it does.
Consequently, the smaller the value of the firms to be auctioned off (Le. the lower the revenue generated by these firms or the smaller the proportion of firms yet to be privatized), the lower the total budgetary cost of the revenue-sharing scheme relative to that of the wage subsidy scheme. Since the process of privatization is already far advanced, while the labor turnover costs and entry costs (that raise the direct budgetary cost of the wage subsidy scheme relative to the revenue-sharing scheme) are sizeable, it is to be expected that the total budgetary cost of the revenue-sharing scheme will generally be lower than that of the wage subsidy scheme.
Concluding Remarks
The analysis above is meant to provide a simple, tractable framework within which the relative social benefits and budgetary costs of wage subsidies versus revenue-or profit-sharing subsidies can be assessed. It is worth stressing that the implementation of either policy would probably lead to substantial social and Wage subsidies lead to higher wages as well as to higher employment, and subsidies large enough to achieve full employment may well lead to extravagantly high wages. By contrast, revenue-sharing schemes, even in the absence of subsidies, may be expected to bring the labor market close to full employment, and consequently the subsidies can be set so as to achieve an appropriate level of labor income.
There is good reason to believe, however, that this by no means exhausts the advantages of revenue-sharing subsidies relative to wage subsidies. Wage subsidies distort the labor-capital ratio, whereas revenue-or profit-sharing subsidies do not.
Finally, 1n small' enterprises where individual workers' labor inputs can have a noticeable effect on the profits of their enterprise, the revenue-or profit-sharing subsidies may be expected. to have incentive effects that the wage subsidies cannot reproduce.
Furthermore, it is important to.observe that the above,..mentioned deficiency of wage subsidies is generally also shared by output, export, credit, and investment subsidies. All of these subsidies tend to increase the marginal value product. of labor 19 and thereby raise the amount of economic rent that may be partially appropriated by workers in the wage bargaining process. Thus these subsidies, like the wage subsidies, lead to wage increases, and subsidies that are sufficiently high to ensure full employment may generate real wages far in excess of government targets. The implications for the budgetary costs of these subsidies are also similar to those of the wage SUbsidies. As we have seen, when wage subsidies raise wages, they automatically raise the direct budgetary cost of the wage subsidy program, since the total government expenditure on wage subsidies is positively related to the level of wages. By contrast, when output, eXl?ort, credit, or investment subsidies raise wages, they do not thereby have any impact effect on the magnitude of the subsidy payments. They do, however, have an important indirect effect: the induced rise in wages discourages employment and consequently higher subsidies are now required to achieve full employment than would have been called for in the absence of the wage increase. It is for this reason that the induced wage increase raises the budgetary cost of these subsidy schemes.
190f course, if labor and capital are Edgeworth substitutes then investment subsidies that raise the capital stock will reduce the marginal product of labor, but this contingency appears not to be predominant in practice. 23
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Finally, it is significant that many of the most serious criticisms that have been le~eled against the establishment of profit-or revenue-sharing schemes in mature market economies appear to lose much of their force with regard to economies that are in the process of transformation to a market mechanism. It has been asserted, for example, that managers of firms may have a substantial incentive to resist switching from a wage system to a profit-or revenue-sharing system, because the latter involves revealing revenue information to the employees. Moreover, the insiders in these firms may also have an incentive to resist, since they may be able to achieve higher remuneration under the wage system. lO It is clear, however, that these problems are likely to be much more pronounced for existing firms that have operated under a wage system in the past and that employ workforces containing a large proportion of insiders. Yet East Germany. 'like other eastern European economies, has experienced such substantial shifts in final demand that the establishment of a revenue-sharing system. would lead to the destruction of most old firms and the creation of many new ones. Thus it is to be expected that most of the jobs operating under the revenue-sharing system would not involve switching from the wage system and reparameterizing insider contracts and thereby would avoid the conflicts with the vested interests of incumbent workers and firms.
In view of these various considerations, the analysis above suggests that revenue-sharing subsidies deserve more attention in the policy debate concerning employment stimulation in East Germany -as well as in other eastern European economies -than they have thus far received.
lOOf course, a two-tier revenue-sharing system could be implemented, whereby insiders are offered a sufficiently large revenue-sharing coefficient to prevent a drop in insider income while new entrants receive a lower coefficient. The problem with this approach is that insider generally resist two-tier systems since they often prove to be time-inconsistent: at a future date, when the current entrants have achieved a comparable productivity to the current insiders -the firm will have an incentive to retain the low-paid entrants and dismess the high-paid insiders. Besides, a sufficiently large revenue-sharing coefficient for insiders may not be sustainable by the relative bargaining strengths and fall-back positions of the insiders and their firms, in which case firms will have an incentive to reduce the insiders' revenuesharing coefficient in future bargaining rounds.
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